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Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra undergoes renovation in 2008

Victory over Terrorism
Essential Services as
Counterinsurgency Strategy

By J e f f r e y P h i l i p T r e i s t m a n

U.S. Army (Roszario Williams)

B

y 2006, U.S. Iraq policy, based
on the 2005 National Strategy
for Victory in Iraq, appeared
to be failing. The February
bombing of the al-Askari Mosque sparked
a wave of sectarian violence that seemed to
push Iraq to the brink of civil war. The United
Nations estimated nearly 25,000 Iraqis fell
victim to violence over the course of 2006, and
nearly 1,000 U.S. troops were killed. Violence
had reached record levels and thousands
began to flee the country, crippling the entire
nation. Analogies to the Vietnam War were
increasingly drawn.
On January 10, 2007, President George
W. Bush announced a “new way forward in
Iraq” that would improve security by focusing
predominantly on Baghdad where the majority of the violence transpired.1 The plan called
for intensifying American involvement while
simultaneously pressing the government of
Iraq to assume a leading role. A “surge” of
an additional 21,500 troops would provide
breathing room for political reconciliation
and economic development. This new strategy would become known as the Baghdad
Security Plan, or Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ) in
Arabic.
The preponderance of postsurge analysis is devoted to military operations and their
subsequent efficacy in reducing levels of violence by concentrating on troop deployments,
tactics, and intelligence. Such studies are valuable, but only to a certain extent. Any holistic
appraisal must also consider noncombat
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counterinsurgency strategies that addressed
social issues—in particular, essential services.
Reminiscent of Lebanon’s Hizballah, militias
in Baghdad sought ascendency over services
as a means to solidify control and influence.
Therefore, the most pragmatic remedy for
long-term stability in Iraq was not necessarily
countering militants with force, but securing
the populace’s allegiance to their government
through the provision of services and opportunities for employment.
The fundamental issue was that the
average citizen was physically and economically vulnerable to malign influences. It
became imperative for the coalition to counter
militias by guaranteeing the well-being of
Baghdad’s residents. Emphasizing reconstruction projects not only improved the delivery of
services, but also, more importantly, provided
employment, reestablished the integrity of the
Iraqi government, and created stakeholders in
the overall process.

Importance of Services
Counterinsurgency (COIN) theorists
posit that there is no direct correlation
between the availability of essential services
and violence.2 Specifically in terms of Iraq,
some areas had far lower levels of violence and
less accessibility to services than others. On
the other hand, unemployment and illiteracy
in an atmosphere of competing factions made

individuals economically vulnerable and thus
susceptible to malevolent influences. The
vacuum created by political power struggles
was certainly not propitious and allowed
militias to supersede official institutions in
providing public goods and employment.
Militants were able to offer employment to
those with little work experience, education,
or training, and in return the conscripts
received a salary, immunity from attack, and a
social sense of belonging.
As a result, it became increasingly
evident that provision of services would be
indispensable in countering both insurgents
and militias. A cooperative effort emerged
between the U.S. Embassy and coalition
forces that emphasized essential services
as a central COIN tactic. Jobs generated
from official reconstruction initiatives were
extremely valuable in thwarting recruitment
efforts of malignant actors. At the same time,
government-sanctioned projects reduced the
public’s dependency on extralegal groups for
services and simultaneously strengthened the
government’s integrity. Finally, tapping local
labor pools engendered stakeholders in neighborhood construction projects and fostered
an intolerance to sabotage. The strategy was
tremendously vital in enervating the strength
of militias in Baghdad.
In contrast, attempts to pass key legislation intended to eliminate political incentives
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of terrorists proved slow and inadequate. Parliamentarians within the secure confines of
the International Zone were far too removed
from the realities of neighborhood conflict to
be effectual. The dissolution of the FAQ Political Committee was certainly demonstrative
of this reality. The apparent inadequacy of

added that he had received full support from
the prime minister.
However, on the afternoon of March
23, a member of Zoubai’s security team
detonated a ball bearing suicide vest inside
Zoubai’s residence. Severely injured, Zoubai
spent several months recuperating in Jordan.

parliamentarians within the secure confines of the International
Zone were far too removed from the realities of neighborhood
conflict to be effectual
legislation, however, did not deter the prime
minister from devising alternative political
solutions and establishing an official cabinet
committee to address essential services.

Political Dynamics
Baghdad’s political parties, personalities, and demographics played a fundamental
role in shaping the outcome of FAQ and the
delivery of services. The political dynamics were bewildering and were made even
more complicated when accounting for the
discrepancies between local and national
perspectives. The most salient political partition existed between religious sects. Sunnis
were predominantly aligned with the Tawafuq
bloc, which was comprised of three separate
political parties: the Iraqi Islamic Party, the
Iraqi People’s Conference, and the National
Dialogue Council. The initial chairman
of the FAQ Essential Services Committee,
Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zoubai, was
a notable member of this alliance. Meanwhile,
the majority of Shia belonged to the Islamic
Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) but would
often vie with the Sadrist Trend and its militant wing, Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), for political
primacy in Baghdad. The power struggle
among these differing parties, both internal
and external, created a political vacuum that
would be detrimentally filled by militants.
Essential Services Committee. In
support of FAQ, Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki formed the Essential Services Committee, to be headed by Zoubai. The committee was to facilitate the repair and delivery
of essential services immediately following
combat activity and would then submit a
weekly status report to the prime minister
during the Iraq Executive Steering Committee (IESC)3 meeting. During a meeting with
Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard
on January 10, 2007, Zoubai confirmed that
he would be responsible for the portfolio and
n d u p res s .ndu.edu

His absence proved debilitating to efforts to
improve the delivery of essential services.
Without Zoubai’s authority, his advisors felt
powerless and were timid in presenting reconstruction developments to the prime minister.
The assassination attempt severely hampered
reconstruction efforts, and the eventual withdrawal of the Tawafuq political bloc in August
2007 ended Zoubai’s involvement.
In November, the prime minister designated Ahmed Chalabi as temporary lead for
Baghdad services. From the commencement of
his appointment, however, his role and responsibilities remained fluid. Chalabi did not
occupy a constitutionally recognized cabinet
position, and the Baghdad Amanat,4 governor,
Provincial Council,5 and ministers did not
necessarily recognize his authority in this
seemingly ad hoc appointment. Furthermore,
he did not have direct access to an official
channel of government financial resources.
Despite these administrative hurdles, he
remained actively engaged, and Iraqi citizens
tended to swarm Chalabi in public settings
with their petitions. He cheerfully admitted
that the purpose of his committee was “to
provide band-aids, not structural solutions to
problems.” Indeed, Maliki’s intent in putting
Chalabi in charge of the committee was to
produce quick, tangible solutions to the problems of Baghdad’s citizens.
Manipulation of Services. As Iraqi
officials struggled to organize themselves,
various nonstate actors took full advantage
of the government’s vacillation and quickly
filled the leadership vacuum. Contingent
upon their own political loyalties, militias
pursued distinctive agendas to manipulate essential services to their advantage.
Whereas Sunni insurgents wanted to
undermine the government’s legitimacy
by destroying infrastructure, Shia militias
aspired to supersede the government with
their own informal networks. Each posed its

own unique set of obstacles and challenges
to the government.
Al Qaeda in Iraq favored a more ideological approach, seeking to dictate social
mores and religious customs at the expense
of humanitarian assistance. Consequently,
their oppressive tactics proved counterproductive as local citizens became increasingly
disenchanted. Sunni extremists also focused
on insurgent activities that attracted Coalition
Forces/Iraqi Security Forces reprisals that
often harmed innocent civilians and neighborhood property.6
On the other hand, many Shia militias
were initially mobilized in an effort to neutralize the growing atmosphere of fear and
insecurity sparked by mounting sectarian tensions. The purging of local communities may
have begun under the precept of removing
terrorist threats but quickly devolved into sectarian displacement. In turn, the displacement
afforded militia leaders a window of opportunity to consolidate neighborhood control.

the purging of local
communities may have
begun under the precept of
removing terrorist threats
but quickly devolved into
sectarian displacement
A variety of intimidation tactics were
employed to secure the obedience of local
residents once they had effectively expelled
their sectarian adversary. These methods
included bribery, verbal or physical assault,
assassination, or public execution. After
establishing their hegemony, militants
would then coopt local officials and hijack
government resources.
The JAM militia, and to a lesser extent
ISCI, operated a sophisticated extralegal
governance network to manage their interests and even set up subordinate offices that
focused on administrative tasks including
finances, public relations, and technical
affairs. Citizens would therefore become
artificially beholden to militias for services,
employment, and security. These extralegal
institutions eroded government credibility
and perilously installed militant leaders who
were not accountable to the local population.
Formal government institutions were
incapable of stopping or even complicit in the
militias’ attempts to manipulate Baghdad’s
issue 53, 2 d quarter 2009 / JFQ     111
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services. In particular, corruption was abundant at both national and provincial levels.
Officials would simply siphon finances,
appoint militants to influential positions, or
redirect reconstruction projects to areas dominated by their respective political parties.
The Board of Supreme Audit, the independent
Iraqi agency that served as a watchdog to
monitor financial and administrative operations of the government, was inadequately
equipped to investigate the accusations and
was equally plagued with political interference, intimidation/assassination of agents,
and limited resources.
The combination of institutional ineptitude and inability of Iraqi officials to delineate
responsibilities among themselves highlighted
the inchoate nature of the government. Many
were uncertain of their legal authorities and
lacked the conviction necessary to spearhead
public policy. This allowed municipal directorates to be held hostage by the actors who
sought their control. Representatives of various
U.S. Government agencies urged the Iraqis to
adopt procedures that would instill transparency and mitigate vulnerabilities, particularly
in the delivery of essential services.

portfolios, the extent of which was not fully
appreciated by the Iraqis.
Reconstruction initiatives were also
pursued simultaneously by several entities
without knowledge of each other’s activities.
The efforts were both duplicative and counterproductive. It was not uncommon for one
agency to repave a neighborhood street only
to see it excavated by another agency the following week to lay new sewage pipes.
To redress the problem, the Department of
State and Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF–I)
established the Joint Reconstruction Operations
Center (JROC) and Joint Planning Committee (JPC). By decree of Fragmentary Order
#06–468, the concept of operations stated:
The Joint Reconstruction Operations Center
will be a single-source fusion center that
provides a common operating picture of all
non-kinetic projects and programs that impact
the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP). The JROC
will conduct planning that synchronizes and
integrates non-kinetic projects and programs in
support of BSP. During the execution of a plan
the JROC will monitor and track the status of
each project and program followed with an
assessment of the effect created.7

Improving Essential Services
Perhaps the most significant impediment to rebuilding Baghdad’s infrastructure
was the absence of communication among the
politicians who managed the city’s institutions.
The plethora of independent funding sources
precluded synchronization of projects and fostered an atmosphere of haphazard reconstruction. Meanwhile, corruption and militia interference inhibited local access to services. The
U.S. Government continuously encouraged
the government to implement administrative
reforms, and as a result the Joint Planning
Committee and Project Clean Delivery were
launched as cooperative ventures.
Joint Planning and Reconstruction
Committees. It became astonishingly evident
that Iraqi officials failed to communicate with
each other at even the most basic levels. Ministries did not fully appreciate the interdependence of their respective sectors. For example,
the delivery of clean water to Baghdad residents required fuel to run electric generators,
and subsequently water treatment facilities
required electricity to power pumping units.
Above all, security was needed to protect the
linear infrastructure that actually delivered
the product. These requirements clearly
encompassed many different ministerial
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The key deliverable of the JROC was a
weekly brief to the JPC, which was intended
to provide strategic direction. Committees
included a myriad of both government of
Iraq and U.S. Government implementing
agencies, but more importantly, members
were derived from local Iraqi organizations to ensure community interests were
adequately represented. The group reviewed
neighborhood projects, verified mechanisms
were in place to deliver essential services,
and adjudicated conflicts between different
organizations. In attempting to maximize

Joint Planning Committee
members were derived from
local Iraqi organizations to
ensure community interests
were adequately represented
resources, the JPC concentrated on what
became known as SWET–H (sewage, water,
electrical, trash, and health). Any conflict
that could not be resolved in the JPC would
theoretically be elevated to the IESC. In
practice, however, this never occurred.

 aghdad Security Plan
B
Reconstruction Process
Iraq Executive Steering Committee

Joint Planning Committee

Joint Reconstruction Operations Center

INPUTS
Amanat, Provincial Council, Ministries,
Brigade Combat Teams, other U.S.
agencies
Ryadh al-Falahi, an advisor to Zoubai,
served as JPC chairman and provided
national oversight to an otherwise local
endeavor. His role was vital in verifying that
district councils were actively committed to
representing their community. Falahi also
had the ability to understand the indigenous
mindset, which was often culturally difficult
for coalition members to perceive. To satisfy
the U.S. Government objective of appearing impartial, Falahi provided a sense of
legitimacy and an aura of Iraqi ownership
to a committee that was otherwise wholly
American.
The JPC offered a forum in which Iraqi
leaders vented frustrations and supported
local development efforts. Perhaps most
notably, it allowed Iraqis to jointly manage
financial expenditures with their American
colleagues. This was a vital arrangement considering that roughly 30 percent of projects
funded by the U.S. Government were disputed
by Baghdad’s district councils and/or Amanat.
Consequently, the JPC served to counter perceptions of misdirected funding and ensured
that demand equitably met supply.
In and of itself, the JPC was a momentous feat, but it admittedly failed to achieve
the aspirations originally envisioned by Washington. The lack of a higher Iraqi authority,
particularly Zoubai, rendered Falahi powerless to elevate issues to the IESC. Furthermore,
absence of the mayor, Provincial Council
chairman, and governor meant that decisions
made during the JPC were not guaranteed to
be enforced by provincial leadership.
ndupres s . ndu. edu
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Iraqi firefighters attempt to control
blaze after terrorist rocket attack on
oil pipeline in Kirkuk

U.S. Air Force (Samuel Bendet)

Instead, the JPC simply became a
medium for situational awareness. This was
not necessarily a negative outcome since the
government of Iraq had limited knowledge
of ongoing projects within the city. The
committee also cultivated an environment
in which Iraqis became acquainted with
one another. State Department attendees
frequently witnessed Iraqi officials exchanging contact information for the first time.
Most importantly, the JPC introduced an
administrative mechanism that encouraged
cooperation and dialogue among all Iraqi
agencies. Such horizontal linkages were
nonexistent during the previous regime.
The effect was an improvement in communications among all relevant parties, which
the U.S. Embassy considered a significant
achievement of the FAQ.
To capitalize on the success, internalization of the JPC was crucial to ensure
long-term sustainability. Since its inception,
the goal had always been to transfer the JPC
to the Iraqi government, but the difficulty
was determining who would actually assume
ownership. The U.S. Government privately
debated the merits of national versus provincial control within the context of the new
federalist structure of Iraq. At the same time,
the Iraqis grappled with similar questions as
they struggled to form their new nation. Until
a settlement could be reached, the JPC continued to be managed entirely by the Americans
with Iraqi participation.
On March 13, 2008, however, the
Baghdad Provincial Council finally took possession of the JPC and hosted the meeting for
the first time at its headquarters. The committee would now be chaired by council member
Nazar al-Sultani, who in his opening remarks
noted the historical significance of the transition. Over the course of the following months,
the Provincial Council slowly accepted
responsibility for administrative duties,
including drafting and distributing meeting
notes. Sultani even announced on June 12 a
new JPC format in an effort to streamline the
overall process.
By the end of 2007, the JROC/JPC had
successfully spawned similar forums. The
Joint Rural Planning Committee (JRPC)
expanded the JPC concept into the outlying
Qadas (rural districts) of Baghdad Province.
The initiative immediately proved successful
by applying lessons learned from the JPC, and
was central in reaching out to communities
that consisted mainly of Sunnis dispersed

along tribal lineages. Meanwhile, the Executive JPC, which had to that point been limited
only to coalition members, incorporated
provincial Iraqi counterparts to form the
Baghdad Provincial Executive Planning
Session (BPEPS). Cochaired by Provincial
Council chairman Mueen al-Khademy and
coalition representatives, the BPEPS was
largely restricted to strategic discussions
pertaining to economic development and
essential services.
By assuming responsibility for municipal reconstruction efforts, the government of
Iraq began to demonstrate its functionality
and dedication to the people of Baghdad.
Iraqi ability to effectively mobilize resources
became a source of great pride. Although
in many respects the government may not
have been entirely proficient by Western
standards, it nevertheless strove to improve
essential services. The internalization of
the JPC symbolized a great step forward in
achieving Iraqi goals.
Project Clean Delivery. Corruption
was quite pervasive throughout Iraq but
was particularly acute in the fuel sector.
Security assessments found that the majority
of attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure were
financially motivated. The sale of crude oil
derived from interdictions funded the illicit
activities of varying groups, including insurgents, militias, and criminals. The interdiction of pipelines forced the government to
use tanker trucks as alternative means of

distribution, but these too proved to be an
easy target for theft and smuggling.
The incapability of the Ministry of Oil
to adequately perform administrative functions such as contracting and strategic planning was relentlessly exacerbated by assassinations, kidnappings, and intimidation. A
dearth of qualified technocrats to fill critical
positions within the ministry did not bode
well for other operations. Moreover, the minister, Husayn al-Shahristani, was believed to
be incompetent. He was accused of sectarianism and often signed contracts that appeared
exceedingly preferential to Iran.
Municipal fuel supplies were highly
susceptible to corruption. Databases that
recorded deliveries were egregiously fabricated and did not reflect actual quantities.
The U.S. Energy Fusion Cell also discovered
that ministerial tankers delivered fuel to fictitious gas stations that were later revealed to be
abandoned buildings or empty lots. Residents
were ultimately forced to purchase from the
black market, which funded and perpetuated
militia activities.
Project Clean Delivery was a pilot
project initiated in December 2007 and
entirely led by the Iraqi government via the
National Security Advisor’s (NSA’s) office.
The U.S. Embassy originally conceived the
program but assumed a merely supporting
and advisory role during its implementation.
The purpose of Project Clean Delivery was to
develop the Iraqi capacity to remove malign
issue 53, 2 d quarter 2009 / JFQ     113
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Iraqi prime minister attends opening
ceremonies of reconstructed Sarafiya
Bridge in Baghdad, May 2008

actors and corrupt administrators from the
supply chain of kerosene delivery in Baghdad.
This was achieved through intensive monitoring and by ensuring delivery of product at the
government rate. These tactics proved efficacious and ultimately eliminated a key source
of revenue for Baghdad’s militant gangs.
Overall, the process allowed government
participants to understand the value of interministerial coordination and synchronization
with security agencies.
In April 2008, the Iraqi interagency
team reported that 90 percent of kerosene
reached target neighborhoods, equating to
5 million liters delivered to 50,000 families
in 12 neighborhoods. This was considered
a major accomplishment in comparison to
previous statistics, and the militia’s reaction
to Project Clean Delivery testified to its
success. JAM assassinated two neighborhood council members for their participation and threatened several others. The NSA
lead, Saeed Jabour, concluded that “you can’t
expect to transform a system that has corruption everywhere and not have problems.
They are inevitable.”
Failure to Build. The emphasis on
public services as a counterinsurgency
stratagem still faced enormous obstacles
beyond U.S. Government control. Internal
Iraqi government power struggles and
the ensuing political vacuum complicated
Baghdad’s reconstruction. The Department
of State, specifically the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office, had invested a great
deal of faith in the capability of Zoubai to
advance the Essential Services Committee. Unfortunately, Tawafuq’s withdrawal
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created a leadership void that severely hindered the implementation of policy during
FAQ. For example, in the summer of 2007,
U.S. and Iraqi engineers jointly formulated
a list of proposed sewage projects estimated
at $26 million and anticipated that Zoubai
would work with his counterparts to
secure supplemental funding. His absence,
however, caused these projects to languish
until they were eventually incorporated into
Iraq’s 2008 budget.
Tawafuq’s departure proved an unexpected political affair and left Washington
with few alternatives. Department of Defense
and State officials expressed their disapproval
of the boycott and were disappointed with
Tawafuq’s apparent lack of regard for Baghdad’s development. During a meeting with
the author on October 24, 2007, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi seemed completely
oblivious to the implications that Tawafuq’s
withdrawal would have for efforts to improve
essential services. Nevertheless, the Americans understood the nature of the dispute
and realized that the matter would have to be
resolved internally among the Iraqis as part
of the natural growing process of the country.
The U.S. Government would instead foster
other Iraqi partnerships, most conspicuously
with Chalabi.
Lights Out on Chalabi. In light of Chalabi’s notorious past, U.S. officials internally
disputed how to best approach his new role
as head of the Essential Services Committee.
Some were eager to establish a rapport with
Chalabi, who could potentially petition for
requisite services, while others proposed
marginalizing him in favor of bolstering

existing municipal institutions. The end
result was consistent U.S. Government
attendance at Chalabi’s committee meetings but refrainment from forging intimate
relations. In essence, the State Department
merely reported on deliberations within the
committee.
By spring of 2008, a plethora of reports
began to surface that implicated Chalabi
in associating with JAM Special Groups.
He was also accused of other nefarious
activities, including arms sales and money
laundering. Of course, the acknowledged
conventional difficulty with information is
the inability to substantiate its veracity, but
the quantity and consistency of the reporting proved particularly alarming. If the
reports were indeed factual, it was assayed
that Chalabi’s actions were not likely to have
been motivated by malice or sectarianism,
but rather personal gain consistent with his
modus operandi.
Regardless, the reports compelled
both MNF–I and the U.S. Embassy to alter
their respective postures and no longer
engage with Chalabi or his staff. Furthermore, a moratorium had been placed on the
issuance of all International Zone badges
for Chalabi’s office, and existing U.S. visa
applications were denied to various staff
members. The prime minister took a similar
course of action by officially removing
Chalabi as head of the Essential Services
Committee and instructing him to no
longer attend the IESC.
The author estimated that the decision
to marginalize Chalabi would have only a
negligible effect on Baghdad services. He
had been a nominal contributor to the city’s
development, and his staff infrequently
attended various intergovernmental coordination meetings. Moreover, the U.S.
Embassy’s Iraq Transition and Assistance
Office and the Provincial Reconstruction
Team both believed that Baghdad’s essential
services should be predominantly led by
provincial leaders (governor, Provincial
Council chairman, and mayor). Baghdad was
unique in that the majority of services were
managed by the Amanat rather than ministries, although the ministries still played a
critical role.

A Symbol of Success
Overall, the government of Iraq
proved relatively adept in responding to the
enormous challenges faced in Baghdad. A
ndupres s . ndu. edu
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prominent symbol of its success during the
FAQ was the rebuilding of the Sarafiya Bridge.
Constructed by British engineers in the early
20th century, the bridge was an important
commercial and transportation link over the
Tigris River and a source of national pride.
Sadly, on April 12, 2007, suicide bombers
detonated a truck laden with explosives while
driving over it. The blast destroyed the bridge
and brought down the main central spans,
negatively affecting commerce and municipal
traffic flow. Baghdad’s residents were deeply
demoralized by its destruction.
Despite some initial obstacles, all
efforts to rebuild the Sarafiya Bridge were
orchestrated autonomously by the Iraqi
government with limited U.S. assistance.
Construction, managed entirely by the
Ministry of Construction and Housing, was
completed on time and within budget and
was officially reopened on May 27, 2008. The
undertaking demonstrated the government’s
capacity to independently pursue emergency
reconstruction of crucial infrastructure
and became one of the most significant
Iraqi accomplishments of the FAQ. Indeed,
during the May 26, 2008, IESC, Prime Minister Maliki called the bridge’s reopening a
“victory over terrorism.”
Depending on their respective affiliations, American politicians are persistent in
their attempts to label the Baghdad Security
Plan as either a success or failure. Militarily, the surge could certainly be hailed as a
success when juxtaposed against statistical trends, but such operations were only
intended to provide space for political reconciliation and economic development. These
aspects were the sine qua non of Iraq’s longterm stability but were much more difficult to
quantify. In the absence of pivotal legislation
or significant expenditures, they could only
be measured subjectively, often based on tacit
developments. The establishment of horizontal linkages and improved lines of intercommunication among Iraqis as a result of the
JPC was a painstaking process that could
only be ascertained over a prolonged period
and exemplifies the challenge in perceiving
such subtleties.
Equally difficult to discern, but of tantamount importance, was the overall capacity
of the Iraqi government. By and large, the
author noticed measured progress in the
cabinet members’ ability to identify and
present issues of concern to the IESC. Previously, discussants often were unprepared,
n d u p res s .ndu.edu

and the resultant briefings were haphazard.
By January 2008, however, visible improvements began to surface. During the January
11 IESC, the Minister of Displacement and
Migration identified specific problems
requiring government attention, and on
January 25, the Deputy Minister of Communications deftly articulated the current status
of his ministry, complete with graphic representation. Both presentations indicated an
increasing capability to recognize and convey
matters within their respective sectors. Moreover, the IESC Secretariat conducted 6-month
and 1-year self-assessments of accomplishments and shortcomings of each FAQ supporting committee, a remarkable feat given
the level of maturity of the Iraqi government.

military operations that
targeted Shia militias in both
Basrah and Sadr City and
Sunni terrorists in Mosul
evinced Maliki’s impartiality
The author observed a gradual
improvement in Maliki’s capability as prime
minister. He appeared more confident in his
position and became increasingly intolerant
of unresponsive cabinet members. Military
operations initiated in March 2008 that targeted Shia militias in both Basrah and Sadr
City and Sunni terrorists in Mosul evinced
Maliki’s impartiality. He proclaimed in April
that the events “have proven that we are
neutral, not biased, that we did not take the
side of this party or this sect against another.
We have also proven there is no security for
any sect unless other sects can be guaranteed
their security.”
These developments were not exclusive
to the executive branch, as legislative officials
also exhibited maturation. The February 13,
2008, passage of several pieces of legislation
demonstrated that the Council of Representative’s speaker, Mahmoud Mashadani, was
becoming more comfortable as leader of the
parliament and testified to his ability to negotiate between dissimilar political blocs.
Above all, Iraqi officials were cognizant
of the value of using essential services as a
counterinsurgency tactic. Zoubai asserted
to State Department officials at the onset of
the FAQ that “security and services cannot
be separated.” On June 11, 2008, the deputy
prime minister’s chief of staff, Khalid alJuboory, affirmed the significance of services

as a COIN policy, stating that “providing
electricity, providing education, and rehabilitating detainees will help solve the problem
of militias. . . . We have learned that many
join militias simply for money and are not
necessarily religious extremists.” Khalid
stressed that electrical reconstruction projects would provide employment that would
reduce the incentive to join militias and
added that “electricity also limits movements
of terrorists at nights and opens shops.”
Ultimately, “electricity solves security and
services problems.” In this respect, President
Bush’s January 10, 2007, address proved particularly astute in proclaiming that “a successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military
operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see
that military operations are accompanied by
visible improvements in their neighborhoods
and communities.”8
Any comprehensive appraisal of counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq must recognize
the delivery of essential services as one of the
most significant components of a multifaceted
strategy. Supported by the United States, the
Iraqi government pursued initiatives that
eliminated opportunities for malign nonstate actors to operate while simultaneously
boosting its own credibility. Such policies
reinforced other factors to engender overall
positive trends in Baghdad that saw a weakening of the influence of militias and insurgents
and a strengthening of the legitimacy and
efficacy of the government of Iraq during the
execution of the Baghdad Security Plan. JFQ
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